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Resumen:
El artículo analiza las trayectorias en las que el pensamiento islámico se manifiesta
en la política estatal en algunos Estados de Medio Oriente y África del Norte como
reacción a la primavera árabe. El objetivo de la publicación es poner de relieve un
cambio ideológico en curso en el pensamiento político islámico de una línea radical a
una moderada, más secular, cambio que se ha ido consolidando en la última década.
El artículo sostiene que tal transformación se da en la forma de movimientos revisio-
nistas capaces de participar en la política del Estado durante la primavera árabe. Ade-
más, este documento afirma la necesidad de la supervivencia y la continuación de
estos poderes islámicos moderados para demostrar que un modelo islámico modera-
do secular existe en realidad, y que podría ser una alternativa al discurso islámico
radical. Por otro parte, este trabajo mantiene que el derrocamiento de Morsi en el
golpe de Estado en Egipto puede llevar, una vez más, a la radicalización de los movi-
mientos islámicos, lo cual implicaría paralizar la evolución y el progreso de la línea
moderada del pensamiento político islámico. Esto puede conducir previamente al
debilitamiento de los partidos religiosos para luego retornar al modo radical adoptado
anteriormente.
Abstract
This paper examines the trajectories in which Islamic thought manifested itself in state
politics in some of the states of the MENA region in light of the Arab Spring. The pur-
pose of this paper is to highlight an ongoing ideological shift in Islamic political thought
from a radical to a more secular moderate line of thought, which has been consolidat-
ing over the past decade. This paper argues that such an ideological shift is taking
place in the form of revisionist movements which were able to engage in state politics
during the Arab Spring. In addition, this paper asserts the need for the survival and
continuity of these moderate Islamic powers as they prove that a secular moderate
Islamic model does in fact exist and could be an alternative to radical Islamic dis-
course. In addition, this paper argues that the overthrowing of Morsi in a coup d’état
in Egypt may lead to re-radicalization and would cripple the evolution and progress of
the moderate line of thought within Islam. This may thus lead to the once curbed
power of religious parties to resolve to the previously adopted radical mode of thought. 
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Section 1: 
Introduction
On the morning of October 23rd 2011, an incredible event took place in the
Arab World. Tunisia, the initial country engulfed by the Arab Spring held their
first parliamentary elections. These elections set a new precedent for democ-
racy in the Middle East, a far cry from the authoritarian regimes that had
become synonymous with the politics of the region. On Election Day fears of
the old system of vote tampering or buying, and other corrupt practices were
rampant; yet as the day progressed, suspicion had morphed into enthusiasm.
Two days later, the official results announced the moderate Islamist Party
Ennahda had won the majority of the seats in the parliament. In doing so, they
ignited a heated debate on political Islam. The results brought both an esca-
lation and some hesitation from those who had questioned the capacity of
moderate Islamists to embrace calls for liberalization and secularization.
Apprehension was not focused on the movement’s commitment to the demo-
cratic process, but rather its commitment to secular law as opposed to the
imposition of sharia law, as demanded by the protesters during the Arab
Spring. In March 2012, Ennahda declared that it would not advocate for
sharia as the main source of legislation in the new constitution. Such a dec-
laration indicated a tendency towards maintaining the secular nature of the
state. Ennahda’s stance on the issue was criticized by hardline Islamists who
demanded a holistic implementation of Islamic Shari’a however; it was warm-
ly welcomed by secular parties.
In November of 2011, that trend would continue with the success of the
Party for Justice and Development, headed by Abdelillah Bennkirane, in
Morocco as the party acquired roughly 107 seats out of 325 seats according
to IFES (www.electionguide.org: 2011). The elections remain an unprece-
dented step for liberalization in the history of Moroccan politics. However, it is
the Islamists that led the way, having more power than any other political
party in the history of Morocco.
In the summer of 2012, this time in Egypt; The Freedom and Justice Party,
the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, also achieved a parliamentary
majority. The success of the Brotherhood, a known conservative force in the
region, once again questioned the duality of the Islamic and the secular. Was
it plausible for the two to act within a single sphere? Or was it true, as some
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suggested that the elections were the foundation for an Islamic state. The
epitome of the Muslim Brotherhood’s success was the election of one of the
Brotherhood’s own, Mohammed Morsi, as president on the 24th of June,
2012. Shortly thereafter, on the 2nd of August 2012 Prime Minister Hisham
Qandil announced his new government would be comprised of thirty five cab-
inet members, twenty-eight of whom were newcomers, including four from the
Muslim Brotherhood. The event lead liberal and secular groups to walk out of
the constituent assembly as they believed it would impose strict Islamic
teachings and practices supported by the Muslim Brotherhood. The situation
was further complicated when president Morsi issued a declaration immuniz-
ing his decrees from challenge. He justified his actions by stating that this was
necessary to protect the work of the constituent assembly. Hostilities and sus-
picions of his ultimate aim intensified as many protestors took to the streets
again in opposition to his feared authoritarianism. Watching from the sidelines
was the Egyptian military. As events intensified, a clash was brewing. The cul-
mination took place on July 3rd, 2013, in the removal of the democratically
elected president Morsi in a coup d’état. Official disclosures state that Morsi
was removed by the Egyptian military on the grounds that he had granted
himself unlimited power. Their stated aim was to protect the nation against
what they saw as the beginnings of a repeat of the Mubarak era. 
Despite the coup d’état; the Brotherhood’s failure in Egypt is also in part
because of their miscalculations. The Brotherhood failed to sustain its prelim-
inary success in Egypt. They were unsuccessful in building viable coalitions
and chose to focus more on consolidating their rule. In addition their exten-
sive use of threatening rhetoric enhanced the validity of the complaints
among the opposition. (Brown, Nathan: October 2013). However, the fact
remains that the majority of the Egyptian people chose these men and women
to lead them. As the military is now the acting government of Egypt, questions
remain. If given a chance to rule, would the Muslim Brotherhood have found
a moderate secular Islamic medium within which to rule the nation? How do
the actions of the Egyptian military undermine the demands of the protesters
of the Arab Spring? And finally, how can the international community ignore
the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood won the election- a win for their organi-
zation, but also a win for moderate Islam? We will never be sure, as in Egypt,
democracy was cut short. This paper asserts that the actions of the Egyptian
military are exactly the kind that destabilizes the development and implemen-
tation of a flourishing secular Islamic doctrine. 
For nearly a decade now, a revisionist movement in Islamic political
thought has been thriving, partly in response to September 11th, but also to a
variety of issues unique to the Muslim world. (Roy: 2012). This shift has seen
Islamists stepping to the forefront, taking a more lenient approach to electoral
politics and a more diverse approach to Islam and the state. The aforemen-
tioned results of the various parliamentary elections clearly demonstrate a
popularization within the minds of Islamic civil societies, irrespective of their
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nation, towards acceptance of this new moderate ideal. However, the success
of this shift from radicalism to moderation can be and is negatively affected
by actions such as the overthrow of Morsi in Egypt and the Russian-Ameri-
can deal in Syria, which has left moderate Islamists on the ground devoid of
sufficient support for their cause.
In the following section, the paper explains the evolution of the trends in
Islamic political thought with regard to internal and external pressures. It high-
lights how radicalizing trends came about and explains the context in which
an ideological shift occurred bringing about the revisionist movement. Section
3 of this paper explains the political context in Tunis, Egypt and Morocco,
which are said to demonstrate most clearly the ideological shift. 
Section 2: 
The evolution of the trends in Islamic political thought.
The radicalization of political Islam dates back to Sayed Qutub during the
1960s. Qutub called for the establishment of an Islamic state governed by
Islamic Sharia and advocated for the formation of a revolutionary vanguard
whose duty was to wage war, jihad, against the non- Islamic systems that
were deemed illegitimate according to divine law (Qutub, 1964). A highly influ-
ential man and a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood, his work and
the work of others like him radicalized Islamic thought for many years. Radi-
calization would assume greater strength in Egypt and elsewhere following
the disappointment of the Middle East Peace Process: Camp David on Sep-
tember 17th, 1978 (Carter, 2006). The failure of this agreement was largely
seen as a failure of secularism to answer the larger political questions that
have long plagued the Muslim world. Keeping with
this trend the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 is a
notable example of radical Islamic ideology success-
fully overthrowing a Western supported secular
leader, Reza Shah (Kinzer, 2003). While the Iranian
revolution should have been a clear indication of the
influential power of radical Islam, it remained under-
estimated. 
The American involvement in the First and Sec-
ond Gulf War during the late 80s and early 90s con-
cluding with the attack on Iraq in 1991 also led to the
reinforcement of the radical school of thought (Scioli-
no, 1991). The idea propagated by hardliners was
that Islamic Sharia served as the all-encompassing
solution, especially when taking into consideration
the failures of the different governing models that
adopted nationalistic or secular ideologies. Evidence of the extremists and
their opposition to democratic participation can further be seen in Algeria, in
1991. Parliamentary elections were cancelled by the military in a coup that














ultimately lead to the Algerian Civil War (Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut,
1999). The West and the larger international community remained concerned
about radicalism yet continued to miscalculate its potential. This eventually
climaxed in Salafi jihadist movements and their transnational demonstrations
of violence, in 1998 in Kenya and then in 2001 in New York City.
The violent attacks of September 11th, 2001 redefined the image of Islam
in the hearts and minds of Western citizens, governments, and media.
Throughout the early 2000s, this new image would shape international policy
toward the MENA region as well as forever alter the Muslim experience in the
West. The new “Islamist”, the “fundamentalist”, the “radical” built a stereotype
upon a minority; it allowed a fringe movement to have a voice for an entire
religion leaving the mainstream Muslim world to live with the consequences. 
The majority of the Islamic movement, who in spite of experiencing an
upswing in conservative thought, is and always has
been moderate. In a direct response to this new
emboldened extremism, the Islamic world was largely
left with a population who no longer put faith in an
Islamic State. Muslims, in the Arab world and beyond,
began to look for new ways to transform their societies
and body politic. In a survey conducted in Egypt, Jor-
dan and Iran by Monsoor Moaddel in 1999 and 2001,
only five months after the September 11th attacks, a
shift in public attitude towards religious institutionalism
was revealed. The pre-9/11 results found that nearly
81 percent of Egyptians saw religious authorities in
favorable terms, compared to only 57 percent following
the 9/11 attacks (Moaddal, 2003). In essence, the pub-
lic had become disillusioned with the concept of an
Islamic State. Prototypes in Iran, Sudan, and Saudi
Arabia have garnered critique and have little popular
support in the wider region. The descending nature of
the radical ideology, embodied in an extremist Islamic
state, has paved a way for a liberal Islamic wave. (El-Affendi 2003: 38). The
effect of the populations growing separation from uncompromising Sharia
combined with its violent portrayal in the media has no doubt had a significant
impact on Islamists. As a result, many have turned back to the movement and
its foundations in search of a new philosophy. Moderates sought to examine,
redefine and consolidate their political Islamic identity in a way that could eas-
ily separate their movement from its radical counterpart. 
It is this new movement built on revisionist thought that has ascended to
parliamentary majorities and the heads of government around the region. The
transformation is clear in platform and policy indicating an increasing shift
towards a secular political Islamic world. In light of the Arab Spring, the world
is witnessing a revisionist society calling for a temperate trend within Islam,
both in policy and in practice. By reengaging with its theological base, these
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liberal men and women have created a new representation of Islam to coun-
teract the once popularizing conservative extremist ideology. 
Section 3:
Framing the Moderate Islamist movement
The Western world has been quick to judge the moderate movements, ignor-
ing the new rhetoric and questioning its moderation and commitment to
democracy. The new moderate platforms were viewed merely a means of
deception to gain power. Once in power, they would then implement a “funda-
mentalist dogma”, focused on creating an Islamic global rule (Ehrenfeld,
2011: 80). Literature demonizing the movement as inherently anti-democratic
or radical builds upon the foundations laid by Orientalist theories propagating
“Islamaphobia” in literature and policy, creating an unproductive or inaccurate
picture of the dynamic nature of the moderate Islamic movement (Ferjani,
2005: 83). In opposition to “radical Islamists theory” a
growing body of literature has formed depicting the
new moderates as post-Islamic, 
“an endeavor to fuse religiosity and rights, Faith and
Freedom, Islam and liberty…an attempt to turn the
underlying principles of Islamism on its head by
emphasizing rights instead of duties, plurality in place
of a singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than
fixed scriptures, and the future instead of the past
(Bayat, 2005: 5).”
The post-Islamist structure seeks to analyze the incor-
poration and legitimacy of democratic principles into
the Islamist framework. Overwhelmingly the analysis
finds a positive correlation between the two, suggest-
ing that the moderate Islamists began using democratic tools as early as the
1990s. In Amr Hamzawy’s The West and Moderate Islam (2005), he writes the
following:
Throughout the last decade the mainstream of Islamist movements has
been moving toward more pragmatism, based on prioritizing gradual dem-
ocratic reforms as the way ahead for their political integration and as the
only viable strategy to challenge the persistent authoritarianism in the Arab
World. Furthermore, the new pragmatism among non-violent Islamist
movements materializes in an atmosphere of relative openness toward
American and European policies in the Arab world, and an initial willing-
ness to engage them less ideologically.
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He notes earlier that,
“..Non-Violent Islamist movements such as the Egyptian and Jordanian
branches of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Moroccan Justice and Devel-
opment Party well rooted in the social and cultural fabric of Arab countries
and possess therefore a great potential for forging broad alliances for polit-
ical transformation.”
As Hamzawy aptly recognizes, scholars are still writing on the incompatibility
of democracy and Islam, while political Islam has already evolved beyond the
scope of this analysis. It is not a stagnant entity; instead, it has been molded
by internal and external pressures. The literature suggests that the democrat-
ic shift is not a phenomenon unique to the Arab Spring. Rather, it developed
over time and under the many radical, oppressive authoritarian regimes as an
opposition movement. The moderate Islamists counteracted rigid ideals
through their pragmatic and democratic principles. 
Post-Islamist theory correctly points to a new trend in the Islamic political
thought. However, it does not seek to explain the evolution of the theology
that is at the core of the Islamists platform. Rather, this framework is influen-
tial in shifting the discussion to the mainstream Islamist groups and their
incorporation of democratic principles since the 1990s. The effects of this new
body of work are slowly being felt throughout the region. In late 2006, one of
the most influential intellectuals in the Jihadist movement, Sayyid Imam al-
Sharif (aka) Dr. Fadl in collaboration with other Jihadist intellectuals released
a new publication, “Rationalizing Jihadist Action in Egypt and the World.” In it,
they dispelled the use of violence, and the radical jihadist cause (Al-Anani,
2009: 3). The new interpretation spread beyond intellectual leaders, as many
within the Jihadist movement began to question the theological basis for vio-
lence. Undoubtedly, this strengthens and enlarges the revisionist movement.
In this way, post-Islamist theory and the debate of democracy and inclusion
have succeeded in converting many of the former supporters of violent Islam.
This is not to suggest all Jihadists are moving towards a moderate Islamist
interpretation, but it does create a framework which can be applied and prop-
agated as the voice of the pragmatic and more inclusive Islamist movements. 
Further, this highlights the shift in the accepted paradigm following the
escalation of violent Islam. This has led to a revision of theology and a new
interpretation of the texts built on more temperate principles. For the Jihadist
movement, temperance meant the relinquishing of power obtained through
force, for the tolerant Islamists it meant a move towards a power by consen-
sus. This new framework built upon and in reaction to the violent Jihadist the-
ory does not seek to contradict previous philosophies, but to expand the over-
all body of literature to include theoretical analysis so as to strengthen the
legitimate and moderate theological shift currently taking place within Islamic
political thought. Revisionists now seek to reinterpret the Islamic texts to com-
ply with the current context of society. This framework poses an obstruction
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to the traditional jihadist epistemological framework which views the texts free
of historical context, calling for the direct application of the sharia. 
As noted above the implementation of a revisionist framework to analyze
political Islam has already been applied to the Jihadi Islamist movements.
The revisionist trend in the Jihadi movement began in 1997 with the de-radi-
calization of the Islamist Group in Egypt and its declaration against the use of
violence (Ashour, 2008). However, the trend did not become wide spread until
the 2000s after the zenith of radical Islamists in 2001 and the subsequent
years during the American occupation of Iraq. But others did follow as vio-
lence became more prevalent and unpalatable to leaders of the movement.
Armed Islamist groups following this trend can be found across the Muslim
World in Egypt, Jordan, Tajikistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia (Ashour, 2008). 
The advent of new interpretation resulted from two significant changes in
the radical Islamist discourse. The first being the non-violent redefinition of
the core ideological support for the Jihadist movement, such as, “takfir
(accusing other Muslims of being infidels), hisba (the duty of Muslims to call
for good and ban evil), and even Jihad…” The second was the new debate
led by leaders within the movement that called the use of violence illegitimate
and un-Islamic, calling their previous notions simplistic interpretations
(Hamzawy and Grebowski, 2010: 5).” The two shifts pushed for a new dynam-
ic within Islam, it signaled a theological evolution in the most radical of the
Islamist organizations dispelling the representation of stagnant Islamist phi-
losophy. 
This body of work sets a new precedent in the analysis of political Islam;
it sets up a framework in which to view theological evolution as the result of
social circumstance that is separate from religious framework. Historic events
are tremendously influential in the creation of philosophy. The social pressure
resulting from the September 11th attacks not only lead to the revision of Jiha-
di thought, but also set a standard for the moderate Islamic movement. 
The events of September 11th, 2001 shocked the world in a dramatic
crescendo of Jihadist Islam, ushering in a period of uncertainty for every
Islamic organization. The event symbolized for many the confrontation of two
civilizations; as Americans mourned; the world was shown images of cele-
brations in the streets of MENA countries. The pictures created a flurry of
misconceptions depicting an entire region as a hotbed of terrorist activity,
with openly supportive populations. Following the attacks the United States
mobilized troops, entering Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. While
Jihadist activity continued to flourish, in Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, they
also turned inward, attacking other Muslims as in the 2003 bombings in
Casablanca, Morocco and the 2005 bombings in Amman, Jordan. The cli-
max of the jihadist movement sent a shockwave to the bedrock of the Islam-
ic community. 
That moment in history was not only followed by an unprecedented
repression of Islamists, both moderate and radical, but also a turning point for
the population. The violent acts presented an Islam that was intolerant, stag-
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nant, and aggressive. In the minds of many, Islam became the new enemy of
progress, a barrier, an arbitrator of oppression upon the minds of the Arab
world. In the face of this crisis, moderate Islamists plunged into an identity cri-
sis. The pragmatic, open, inclusive Muslim movement was unable to escape
the association with the violent Jihadist in Western suspicion. The wave of
violence and terror in a sense forced the hand of the Islamist movement in a




Through their published bodies of work, and the propagation of their ideals, a
new diverse and inclusive framework has emerged. It is utilizing this frame-
work and employing this paradigm that this paper will analyze the progression
and success of a secular political Islam in the Islamic body politic of Moroc-
co, Tunisia, and Egypt. 
Morocco
The trajectory of the Islamic ideologies of Morocco evolved in a segmented
rather than a linear fashion. The movements are represented in multiple
forms that are as unique as the history of Islam in the country itself. Political
Islam in Morocco is a mosaic of movements that prescribe to and challenge
trends in the larger spectrum of Islamism. Like other nations in the Middle
East and Northern Africa the country supports, Salafi, Salafi Jihadist, and rad-
ical Islamist movements, however the country also hosts parties such as the
Justice and Charity Party, a unique representation of Sheikh Abdessalam
Yassine Islamist discourse. 
The Salafi and Salafi Jihadist movement have always played a marginal
role in the political Islamic sphere; never gaining popular support in the pop-
ulation. Conservative citizens instead favored the Justice and Charity party,
which after gaining widespread popular support was officially outlawed in
1990 (Laskier, 2003: 6). Representing the most popular Islamist force in the
country, the organization cultivated a large following. But popularity and cri-
tique of the monarchy brought challenges for the outlawed party. The lack of
a legal consolidated Islamic party lead to the establishment of the Party for
Justice and Development (PJD). The PJD was created in 1997 through the
coalition of several smaller Islamic organizations. At its inception the party
was built upon a platform of conservative ideologies drawing from the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Salafi movement (Amghar, 2007: 1). Between the years
of 1997 and 2001 the party enjoyed relative freedom to express harsh cri-
tiques of western intrusion into Moroccan Culture (Hirichi, 2007). The party’s
platform during 1997-2002 political cycle focused on, “non-Islamic banking,
alcohol consumption, Islamic education, immoral practices in the tourism
industry, and reforming the cinema industry to ensure that it complied with
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Islamic teachings (Hamzawy, 2008: 12).” The platform had a singular purpose
of safeguarding Morocco’s Islamic community, demonizing the western ties
created by the Monarchy, and propagating a conservative movement within
the nation. It wasn’t until after the attacks of September 11th and the
Casablanca bombings in 2003 that the party would develop a moderate plat-
form, redefining itself from an Islamic movement to a party based upon
“Islamic references” (Khalaf 2006). 
Preceding the 2001 attacks, the Moroccan monarchy transformed its open
policy towards Salafi strains of political Islam to suppression, in light of the
regime’s close relationship with the United States. This suppression was rein-
forced after the 2003 terrorist bombings in Casablanca. The bombings creat-
ed a national controversy and a crisis for the growing Party for Justice and
Development. As secularist parties called for the dismantling of the party, the
movement was forced to reevaluate its position as a conservative Islamic
movement (Hamzawy, 2008: 11). The state responded through the creation of
a new law outlawing religious based parties; forcing the Islamist PJD to recre-
ate the image of the party and political platform (Khalaf, 2006). 
In stark contrast to the party’s 1997-2002 cycle platform; the new agenda
focused solely on issues including greater transparency, decreased corrup-
tion and increased accountability among members (Hamzawy, 2008: 10). The
party also sought three major reforms to the constitution, “(1) institute all nec-
essary mechanisms to secure the independence of the judiciary; (2) expand
the supervisory and legislative prerogatives of the House of Representatives
and review those of the House of Councilors; and (3) ensure that the execu-
tive branch is accountable to parliament (Hamzawy, 2008: 12).” The disap-
pearance of religious rhetoric from the platform created a void in the ideolo-
gy. The platform does not overtly suggest a revision of the party’s Islamic prin-
ciples; it is possible the void of Islamist dialogue is a survival strategy. How-
ever, following 2003, the party supported policy transformations that indicate
a clear shift to a moderate Islamist party. 
The 2005 revision of the personal status code in Morocco tested the PJDs
commitment to moderate Islamist principles. The code based on the status of
women and the family in Islamic principles underwent a controversial revision
that represented a monumental step in women’s rights. The conservative
Islamist movement, the Justice and Charity party, opposed the process on the
basis that a revision would signify a step away from Islamic principles. Yet in
a historic move the PJD chose to support the new code’s construction,
despite its liberal interpretation of Islamic family law (Hamzawy, 2008: 9). The
support of the new personal status code signified that the party was open to
the reinterpretation of Islamic principles to promote a more liberalized Moroc-
can society. In an even more controversial measure, in January of 2012, the
party’s newly elected Prime minister, Abdelilah Benkirane, consented to the
relaxation of abortion laws, specifically in cases of rape (Jay, 2012), an
extremely controversial issue in a country that currently allows a rapist to be
absolved of charges if he marries his victim. 
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In a matter of ten years, the dramatic reformation of the PJD over from the
1997-2002 cycle to the 2002-2007 cycle signaled a shift in policy platform that
is almost unrecognizable, the party that was built upon conservative Islamist
principles and Salafism, preceding 2002 showed a remarkable commitment
to a more liberalized interpretation of Islam. The party not only recreated their
political focus, but through support in revisionist policy changes, especially in
the realm of women’s rights, have shown an evolution in their theological
basis from conservative Islamic principles to merely a party influenced by
“Islamic references.”
Tunisia 
In the 1970s, the Tunisian government under the leadership of President
Habib Bourguiba made Islam the official religion in an attempt to diminish the
rising tensions between the government and the opposing Islamic movement,
the Movement de Tendance Islamique (MTI). Yet Bourguiba’s intention was
only to quell the population, not to incorporate Islamic principles into the sec-
ular system. The president became increasingly antagonistic towards
Islamists pressures to use Islamist principles for solutions to national woes. In
reaction, Bourguiba arrested members of the group en masse in 1981.
Throughout the 1980s, the movement would continue to remain in direct con-
frontation with the government who periodically released and arrested mem-
bers of the Islamists in relation to public approval of the state (El-Khawas,
1996: 393). However, the coup in 1987 by the Prime Minister, Zine al-Abidine
bin Ali, promised a new age of democratic freedoms. But the new president
refused to recognize MTI as an official political party. The movement in
response changed their name to Hizb Ennahda (The Renaissance Party) in
hopes to create a new image that would be legally allowed to participate in
the state. Ben Ali only increased state repression by banning the party and its
members from state elections (El-Khawas, 1996: 394). At the same time the
President began to reincorporate Islam into the state, seeking to counteract
the Islamist’s opposition support base in the state. The re-Islamization
process set up an Islamic identity based upon the states interpretation, which
significantly was different from the Ennahda conservative Islamic principles
(Rogers, 2007: 11). The division between the two ideologies gave grounds for
the state to proclaim that the party was both un-Islamic and un-Tunisian, and
characterized it as a criminal organization, expelling the movement from the
country (Rogers, 2007: 21). 
The repression of the party continued and increased in the 21st century.
Pressure compounded in 2002 when a Salafi jihadist organization targeted a
synagogue in Djerba. This attack lead to an anti-terrorism bill that further
repressed Islamist political parties across the spectrum and enhanced Ben
Ali’s control of the state (Boubekeur, 2009). In a paradox in the paradigm, the
repression of the state and violent Islam lead to a counter movement of
increased radicalism in youth, whom felt confined by the suppression of
Islamism from the nation (Boubekeur, 2009). In Tunisia, the state suppressed
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the party into exile until the revolution in 2011. The party returned to the state
as a moderate Islamic party, intent upon rebuilding the nation alongside sec-
ular movements. 
In the elections of 2011, the party built upon the model laid by the Justice
and Development Party in Turkey as a means to legitimize their campaign for
secular political Islam (Lynch, 2011). In the elections, Tunisian’s showed their
support for the party’s platform electing Ennahda to parliamentary majority
with 41.5 percent of the seats (Cammett, 2011). Upon election, fears immedi-
ately rose regarding the implementation of Islamic ideals on the new consti-
tution, but the movement dispelled concerns by announcing the constitution
“will not cite Islamic Law (Fahim, 2012).” This commitment will be tested as
the new system will again hold elections in just two years to inhibit the cre-
ation of another authoritarian power within the state (Churchill, 2012). 
The question is whether or not the movement truly presents a contradic-
tion to the paradigm. The organization has evolved into a moderate Islamic
association operating in the framework of a secular political Islam. However,
the Islamist movement in Tunisia outside of the PJD party experienced an
increased radicalization after the events of September 11th and violent attacks
within the state as a result of state’s suppression. Preceding these acts the
movement was also nearly eliminated from Tunisia and the movement’s lead-
ership were forced abroad, operating outside of its population base (Lynch,
2011). As a result it can be argued that the group developed separately of
state pressures that resulted in the moderation of Islam, but it was not exempt
from the international pressures that had demonized conservative Islam as a
barrier to modernization after the rise of Jihadi Islam. It is apparent that the
party has felt those pressures through its collaboration with secular move-
ments, and commitment to a secular constitution. So while it is not apparent
in rhetoric that the movement shifted its discourse following the 2001 attacks,
this is only a result of the lack of discourse caused by state suppression not
a contradiction to the paradigm. 
Egypt
In 1928, the roots of the modern political Islamic movement were forged in
Egypt with the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood
was founded by Hassan al-Banna as an apolitical organization promoting reli-
gious reform transformed in the 1930s through rapid growth and political over-
tones. Finally entering into the political arena in 1941, the current British gov-
ernment was swift in outlawing the organization whose demonstrations called
for the withdrawal of British troops (Munson, 2001: 488). Despite the ban the
party continued to grow, boasting over two thousand members by 1949 (Mun-
son, 2001: 489). Tensions grew between the government and the party lead-
ing to the assassination of the prime minister, and al-Banna. After the over-
throw of the monarchy, the organization enjoyed amicable relations with the
new government lead by Nasser. However, this ended in 1954 when a mem-
ber of the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate the new leader (Stilt,
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2010:77). Subsequently thousands of members were arrested including lead-
ing intellectuals such as Sayyid Qutb. 
The transition of leaders with the death of Nasser in 1970 and the ascen-
sion of Anwar al-Sadat brought about another period of amicability. In 1979
this ended with the signing of the Camp David Accord and open hostility on
behalf of the organization, leading to the mass arrests of Brotherhood mem-
bers. Following the arrests in 1981 the Islamist Jihad offshoot of the organi-
zation assassinated Sadat, who would be replaced by Hosni Mubarak (Stilt,
2010: 78). Mubarak in an effort to combat the rising religious extremism toler-
ated the more Moderate main branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The organ-
ization flourished throughout the 1980s leaving it in direct opposition to the
state. The 1990s witnessed increasing authoritarian practices by the State,
with hostility directed specifically at the Islamic organization (Stilt, 2010: 79).
As a result the party had low numbers in the official political arena despite its
popular support. 
Leading into the 2011 revolution in Egypt, the 2010 election reaffirmed
Mubarak’s suppression of the party from officials. Frustrations mounted in the
population culminating in the protests, and removal of Mubarak from power.
Following the removal, the Brotherhood created the Freedom and Justice
party to run as a political representative of the movement. The party platform
while still conservative promoted a more moderate face for the movement,
and in the June 2012 elections they claimed the majority in parliament and
their member Mohamed Morsi became the first elected President. 
The Muslim Brotherhood arguably presents the most conservative ideolo-
gy represented in the most recent elections in the Middle East and North
Africa. Egypt, the catalyst of political Islam, has also had the most tumultuous
relationship with the movement. Intellectuals within the movement laid the
groundwork for not only moderate parties but also the most radical. The argu-
ment of a shifting paradigm in political Islamic thought would not be complete
without the analysis of the Islamic movement in Egypt. 
The original ideological formation of the MB was built upon the basis of the
Hanbali School of Islamic jurisprudence, which calls for a literal reading of the
Quran and Sunnah (Munson, 2001: 489). This more literal interpretation of
Islam intersected with the belief of a single Islamic community that must unite
against Western corruption; while at the same time pursuing greater individ-
ual morality through the use of grassroots activism (Munson, 2001: 490). After
years of state suppression, and the assassination of their founder, the mass
arrests after the Nasser assassination attempt lead to the cultivation of the
radical writings of Sayyid Qutb. Qutb’s radical jihadist thought brought about
a new generation of Islamic organizations, who saw violence as a means to
create an Islamic state. 
The period following would leave the Brotherhood without its main leaders
and in an ideological standoff between the moderate majority who rejects
Qutb’s philosophy of jihad and members who viewed it as a revitalization of
the waning political Islamic movement. The latter would become the most
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active group during the 1960s. The Qutbist faction of the Brotherhood envi-
sioned a “revolutionary form of Islamic activism” in which they are the “van-
guard of Islam (Zollner, 2007: 420).” 
In opposition a moderate theological movement also pulsed within the MB
lead by the general guide al-Hudaybi, who rejected the idea of takfir, noting
that, “whoever judges that someone is no longer a Muslim… deviates from
Islam and transgresses God’s will by judging another person’s faith (Leiken
and Brooke, 2007).” In combination with the moderate movement, the incor-
poration of democracy as achievable alongside Islam brought about a new
way for the Brotherhood to participate in formal politics. 
The incorporation of democracy, was a break away from radicals but not
a conservative Islamic interpretation which was still at the heart of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood, not until the creation of the Wasat or center party an off-
shoot of the MB would a shift appear in Islamic ideology in Egypt. The Wasat
party was created by young leaders in the MB who had established an ide-
ology in which Shari’a becomes a general set of principles that allows for
flexibility in public policy (Wickham, 2004: 208). The new platform also sees
one community in which Muslims and Christians have equal rights, as a part
of that it also give equal citizenship rights to women and non-Muslims (Wick-
ham, 2004: 210) . Their liberal platform is reminiscent of both the Ennahda
party and the PJD, yet they have not surpassed the main segment of the MB
in popularity. 
In comparison to the movements in Morocco, Turkey, and Tunisia, the
Freedom and Justice party of Egypt cannot be defined as a secular political
Islamic movement. In a twelve part press release the newly elected Mohamed
Morsi discusses the vision for the future of Egypt, addressing issues such as
education, corruption, employment, individual rights, etc. On individual rights
the release states, 
FJP took upon itself the tasks of rebuilding Egypt, respecting freedoms
and safeguarding fundamental rights for every Egyptian, within a basic
framework of good religious values, defending political and social free-
doms indispensable for people to exercise their rights and improve their
communities; as well as non-discrimination among citizens with regard to
rights and duties on the basis of religion, sex, color, granting women all
their rights – maintaining a balance between their rights and duties (Morsi,
2012)
What is notable within this statement and through the subsequent parts is a
balance between a conservative Islamic philosophy and the incorporation of
a democratic framework. Islam is evident throughout the party platform and
the support for policies such as freedom for citizens is not based in universal
human rights but is, “one of Islam’s duties (Morsi, 2012)”.
In the official program for the 2011 parliamentary elections the party reaf-
firms their commitment to a pluralistic system based on democratic principles
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with Shari’a as a frame of reference not a direct interpretation (Party Program,
2011: 10). The seven fundamental principles a part of the new system are; 
1. The principles of liberty, equality and equal opportunities, 2. Independ-
ence of the Judiciary, 3. Free and fair elections, 4. Accountability, respon-
sibility and questioning authority 5. Decentralized local government, and
impartiality of the administration, 6. Safeguarding citizenship rights, and
the maintenance of national unity, 7. Revitalizing the role of individuals and
civil society (Party Platform, 2011: 10)
While none of the fundamental principles make refer-
ence to an Islamic framework, the next section clarifies
the party’s dual commitment to promoting a, “national
constitution Islamic modern democracy (Party Plat-
form, 2011: 11).” 
In comparison to the liberal take on the rights of all
citizens as equal, regardless of religious affiliation, the
party takes a decidedly conservative stance on the
position of women in society. The party emphasizes
the importance of women based on their role as
“wives, mothers and makers of men.” Promotion of
women rights is equated to the building of stronger
families, while it does note a gap in the provisions for
widows and divorced women (Party Platform, 2011:
26). As a part of their program and basis in Shari’a the
party questions Egyptians compliance with the Con-
vention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW). The main points it raises
are the conflicts with children’s advocacy, homosexual
rights, and principles of adoption (Party Platform, 2011:
25). The language used is inflammatory emphasizing
the hypocrisy of these rights within Islam. Despite the
digression in women’s rights, the party does promote
women’s participation in politics and if there is a true
commitment to democracy their voices could counter-
act the conservative policies of the party. 
The FJP of Egypt has shown within the Islamic
movement the paradigm is still shifting, the ground-
work for a secular Islamic party has been laid in the
principles of the Wasat party. It has been seen that the
shift for the Muslim Brotherhood began following the increase in violent
attacks following 2001. Although the party was excluded from official politics
during the 2005 campaign for the movement, candidates affiliated with the
MB moved away from, “pursuing a divisive religious or cultural agenda” in
favor of socio-economic debates (Leiken and Brook, 2007). Similar to the shift
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witnessed in Morocco between the political cycles from 2001 to 2002, the
absence of Islamic rhetoric symbolized a shift away from the pursuit of a con-
servative Islamic platform. In the most recent campaign the FJP changed the
party’s iconic slogan, “Islam is the Solution” to “Freedom is the Solution and
Justice is the Application (Ikhwanweb, 2011).” The movement’s success in the
elections of 2012 will test the Islamic movement in Egypt’s reform and revi-
sion to a moderate Islam.
Section 4: 
Conclusion
This ideology has been developing now for over a decade and has cemented
itself within the population and the movements. As a political movement,
Islamism has become a public entity that is shaped
by internal and external pressures. Since its incep-
tion, the movement has been affected by its local and
international contexts. It is these contexts that lead to
the gradual radicalization of Islamic ideology that
affected all the movements within political Islam. The
neo-fundamentalist and Salafi Jihadist height of influ-
ence came in the 1990s, as the Muslim world grew
tired of Western cultural domination. In the subse-
quent years, the use of violence by Jihadist groups
pushed Islamist ideology to the forefront of politics
and classrooms around the globe. The discussion
centered itself around the radical form of Islam that
continued to make itself known through the media,
and large acts of violence on the local and interna-
tional front. 
However, as the world watched the fringe transna-
tional terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, the
larger Muslim population was transforming. The
movements that represent the bulk of the Islamic
movement functioned under authoritarian regimes
that limited freedoms the Islamist moderates saw as
basic rights to the people. As economic, societal, and cultural pressures
mounted within the MENA region, the strongest opposition movement left was
the Islamist. With the decrease of nationalist and socialist parties around the
region, they became the main opposition party to the state. 
Throughout the 1990s, as post-Islamist theory suggests, Islamist move-
ments across the region developed internal ideologies of democracy. While
the new ideologies led to greater transparency and representation within the
movement, Islamists remained conservative in their theological foundations.
Leading into the 2000s, conservative Islam had reached its zenith, congruent-
ly with the dramatic culmination of Jihadi Islam on the world stage. The vio-
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lence left a shadow on the public perception of Islam, despite its overwhelm-
ingly moderate majority. As a result of international, government, and internal
pressures even the moderate Islamist parties began to question their theolog-
ical base as a means for survival in an increasingly liberal minded environ-
ment. The results of their identity crisis can be seen in the rhetoric, platforms,
and policy surrounding the revitalized Islamic movements. With rise to power
of Islamists in the region, the question of the hour is how truly moderate are
the Islamic movements? And how does that interact with secular notions of
democracy? The answer lies in the shifting paradigm, through the application
of a revisionist framework shaped by Salafi-Jihadist literature; there is a clear
movement away from conservative principles and a revision of theological
foundations to create platforms that combine Islamic inspirations and secular
foundations of political democracy. The shifting paradigm became concrete in
the Arab Spring. 
Through analysis of the transformation of political Islam, it is clear the par-
adigm has shifted in favor of a secular political Islam. In the coming years the
Islamic movement will either prove or disprove their ability to function within
political society shaped by secular constitutions and governments. However,
the framework suggests the parties have been on the path to
moderation and a secular political Islam since 2001, and the plat-
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